Viewed through a geopolitical lens, Turkey appears as a natural crossroads. Its location links the Eastern Mediterranean with the Black Sea region and the Middle East, while simultaneously extending toward the Caucasus with cultural reach stretching even into Central Asia. This position provides Ankara with strategic depth that few other countries possess. Added to this is a demographic profile significantly younger than that of Europe, a large domestic market with nearly 90 million inhabitants, and a growing security-industrial base that has made the country increasingly visible internationally, particularly through the development of its own drone systems in recent years. Theoretically, Turkey thus possesses all the prerequisites to develop into a dominant regional power not only in the wider Mediterranean, but deep into the Asian continent.
Yet this potential faces a political order that in its current form welcomes no expansion of Turkish power. No actor in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, European, Arab, or Israeli, has a genuine interest in Ankara growing politically, economically, or militarily beyond the existing balance. This becomes most evident in its relationship with Greece. Athens has regarded its neighbor for decades as its primary rival, especially due to disputes over sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, exclusive economic zones, and the unresolved Cyprus issue. For Greece, any expansion of Turkish influence – even between two NATO members – is perceived as a direct threat to national security. This deep-rooted historical rivalry is one of the main reasons tensions persist within the alliance itself, regularly manifesting in maritime incidents or diplomatic standoffs.
A similar case is Cyprus, which has been de facto divided since the 1970s. The Cypriot government continues to view Turkey’s recognition of the north as a fundamental breach of international law. Nicosia sees any expansion of Turkish influence as a threat, especially regarding energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean in which Cyprus and Israel appear as potential partners. Israel itself has historically maintained a pragmatic relationship with Turkey, yet Ankara’s efforts to expand political influence in the Mediterranean collide with Jerusalem’s strategic interests in secure sea lanes, reliable energy partners, and a predictable security architecture. A Turkey that positions itself as a political leader of the Sunni world or supports regional networks such as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood is viewed by Israel as a strategic risk.
Egypt likewise remains wary of any expansion of Turkish influence. The rivalry between Cairo and Ankara, especially after the ousting of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, has left lasting strain. Cairo views Turkey’s involvement in Libya, its military presence in Syria, and its political rhetoric as attempts to expand spheres of influence. For the Nile state, Turkey represents a strategic competitor that could disrupt the regional balance.
Saudi Arabia also has little interest in a rising Turkey. Riyadh looks with suspicion at Turkey’s presence in northern Syria, where Turkish troops and allied militias already operate. A non-Arab state expanding its influence deeper into the Middle East poses not only geopolitical but also emotional challenges for the Gulf monarchies. Particularly because Ankara repeatedly presents itself as a protector of Sunni movements, a role Riyadh traditionally reserves for itself. Moreover, much of the Arab world still associates Turkey with the historical experience of Ottoman rule, which further diminishes the willingness to accept Turkish leadership in the region.
To the north, Ankara encounters resistance as well. Moscow views Turkish foreign policy with increasing vigilance. The coexistence of cooperation and rivalry in Syria, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus remains stable only because both sides calibrate confrontation carefully and occasionally share overlapping interests. Yet Turkey’s growing engagement with other Turkic peoples in Central Asia is increasingly perceived in the Kremlin as a strategic alarm signal. Since Russia has tied down considerable resources and political attention through its war against Ukraine, signs have multiplied that not only China but also Turkey is seizing the opportunity to expand its presence in the region and strengthen political as well as cultural influence despite Russia traditionally regarding Central Asia as its own geopolitical sphere. Platforms such as the Organization of Turkic States or Ankara’s expanding cooperation with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan create soft-power corridors that, from Moscow’s perspective, could undermine its position in the long term.
Alongside these external constraints, Turkey’s domestic situation plays a crucial role. The country has a significant Kurdish population, forming a regional majority in parts of the southeast. Segments of this population have long sought greater political and cultural autonomy, or even an independent Kurdish state. Ankara sees these aspirations as a direct threat to the country’s territorial integrity. The result is a persistent state of tension, repeatedly marked by military operations. Parallel to this, the general political landscape is deeply polarized. Islamist, nationalist, conservative, and liberal forces compete fiercely, undermining political stability.
A country this polarized faces structural difficulties in pursuing long-term foreign policy goals, as domestic conflict drains energy, legitimacy, and resources. Against this backdrop, it becomes evident that Turkey, despite its theoretical power potential, is surrounded by a regional and domestic environment that significantly constrains its room for maneuver. Rationally viewed, Ankara has only two strategic paths.
The first would be deeper integration with the European Union, yet this path is given political differences currently all but closed. The reservations in many EU member states are too great, and the willingness on both sides to pursue full integration has dwindled. The second option is to expand its own strengths further. A Turkey that relies more heavily on economic and technological autonomy and seeks multipolar partnerships could act far more independently in the medium term. Yet such a Turkish move would find little approval in either Brussels or Washington, as it could threaten Western strategic interests whether in the energy sector, Mediterranean security, or the Black Sea region. This produces a highly complex geopolitical picture. Turkey may be theoretically strong enough to exert influence in multiple regions, but it is surrounded by an environment that carefully observes, limits, or actively counters that influence. Ankara’s ambitions meet resistance in nearly every direction. In the west from European skepticism, in the south from Arab rivalries, in the north from Russian sensitivities, and above all under the watchful eye of Washington.
And so reality proves harsher than any vision: wherever too many interests collide, even the greatest ambitions struggle to unfold.