The talks in Geneva between the United States, Ukraine, and several European states have, for the first time, provided a clearer picture of how international diplomacy currently envisions a possible end to the war in Ukraine. The discussions were based on a 28-point plan presented by the U.S. administration. In its original form, the plan required Ukraine to make significant concessions to Russia, including territorial cessions, limits on its armed forces, and a formal renunciation of a potential NATO membership. These points have been extensively documented by international media. After criticism from Kyiv and several European capitals, the United States and Ukraine stated following the Geneva talks that they had worked on a “revised” framework. Although the details have not been fully published, it appears that the original draft was adjusted in key areas.
Notable in the run-up to the talks was the contradictory messaging from Washington. President Trump later described the plan as “not final.” At the same time, several U.S. senators publicly claimed that they had been told the draft was largely based on Russian proposals. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. State Department contradicted this account and emphasized that the plan was an American initiative that merely incorporated suggestions from different sides. Another interest aspect involves businessman Steve Witkoff, a close associate of Donald Trump, who despite lacking diplomatic experience was involved in early versions of the plan. Media reports also note that he traveled to Moscow several times. His involvement has been assessed in various ways and points to a growing entanglement of individuals without official governmental or diplomatic roles. Neither elected officials, nor civil servants, nor traditional diplomats in U.S. foreign-policy decision-making. While this does not reflect standard diplomatic practice, the use of informal advisers in U.S. foreign policy is not new. Historical examples, from unofficial envoys to personal associates of former presidents, show that such channels are often used when quick results are sought or when a president has limited trust in established institutional structures. For international partners, however, this can make it more difficult to determine which position represents the official U.S. line.
For Ukraine, the starting point was challenging. President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that the original draft crossed several of his red lines. At the same time, the country remains heavily dependent on military and financial support from the United States. The fact that Kyiv and Washington jointly spoke of a “refined framework” after the Geneva meetings suggests that the Ukrainian president was able to bring in his own interests – albeit under significant pressure.
Yet the central point that emerges, often between the lines, is the visibility of Europe’s actual capacity for action. Although the European Union and several of its member states were represented in Geneva and submitted their own amendments and additions, the course of the talks makes it clear that the strategic direction of the peace considerations is being set in Washington. Europe is present and involved, but operates largely in a corrective role, no longer as the driving force that shapes the negotiation framework itself. This creates a striking contrast. Europe bears a significant share of the costs of the war, economically, in terms of security, and socially, yet it is not the principal architect of potential peace arrangements. The gap between exposure and influence is clearly visible.
Another relevant factor concerns Washington’s long-term strategic planning. For years, the United States has sought to shift its foreign- and security-policy focus more strongly toward the Indo-Pacific. This so-called “Pivot to Asia” was introduced under President Obama, emphasized again under President Biden, and remains a central pillar of American geopolitics. To counter China’s growing influence in Asia, successive U.S. administrations have shown remarkable flexibility. Even ideological differences once seen as insurmountable were pragmatically set aside. The United States, for example, deepened its security and economic ties with communist Vietnam. A move widely highlighted in the media and one that underscores the strategic priority of expanding partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, irrespective of political system differences. At the same time, a prolonged and resource-intensive war in Eastern Europe ties up political attention, financial resources, and military capabilities. A conflict of this scale inevitably slows the geopolitical shift toward the Far East. From this perspective, it appears plausible that President Trump has an interest in preventing the conflict from continuing at its current intensity so as not to impede the strategic focus on Beijing and the Indo-Pacific. This does not mean that the White House is acting at Ukraine’s expense, but rather that the United States’ broader global strategy inevitably influences its willingness to negotiate. This is not unusual. Major powers prioritize their long-term security objectives, and these inevitably shape diplomatic processes.
Compounding this, many European states have, over the past two decades, deliberately relied on U.S. security guarantees for their military preparedness. This structural dependence means that Washington today carries a disproportionately large share of the security burden on the so-called Old Continent. A responsibility that is neither politically intended nor sustainable in its current form. At the same time, it contributes to Europe being perceived as having limited influence during moments of crisis. Had Europe developed a more autonomous and robust defense capability, Brussels would likely be regarded as a more serious strategic actor in both Washington and Moscow.
A look back underscores that the distribution of roles was once different. During the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and the international missions in Afghanistan, the United States and Europe worked much more closely together, both militarily and diplomatically. The EU also played a visible mediating role for years within the Normandy Format. Today, however, the picture has shifted. The EU member states and the United Kingdom are increasingly seen as partners capable of making important contributions, but less frequently as strategic lead actors. Several cautious conclusions can be drawn from today’s perspective:
First:
The United States is driving the diplomatic process because it possesses both the means and the strategic priorities to do so.
Second:
Ukraine is bringing its own interests into the negotiations but remains under significant pressure due to its dependency on external support.
Third:
Europe is committed and engaged, yet it has less influence on the foundational architecture of the negotiation process than in previous security crises.
Fourth:
Washington’s global focus, particularly its prioritization of the Indo-Pacific, further strengthens the American interest in a more predictable and containable end to the conflict.
Thus, the Geneva talks reveal less about the quality of a single peace plan and more about the current power dynamics within the Western alliance. Europe is at the table, but not at the head of it. That seat belongs to the United States – like during the Gaza peace negotiations.
What will be decisive is whether the European Union succeeds in strengthening its military and strategic capacity in the coming years so that it can not only react in future conflicts, but actively shape outcomes. This would benefit not only Europe itself but the entire West, which faces significant challenges in the years ahead. This will require not only reinforcing national armed forces within the EU but also, in the medium term, the consistent development of European defense structures. while maintaining transatlantic integration. Not as a theoretical concept, but as a genuinely capable reality.