For decades, the West was not only militarily and economically strong but also culturally and politically influential. Its social and political model functioned as a global reference point and conveyed a widely recognized promise. Individual freedom, economic opportunity, the rule of law, and institutional stability. For many people around the world, Western societies represented a place of possibility or a benchmark for development. In recent years, however, this perception has begun to shift. The gradual decline in soft power, the type of influence based on appeal, credibility, and normative strength, is increasingly evident in global opinion surveys, diplomatic interactions, and the strategic positioning of emerging economies, as well as in how authoritarian governments describe and evaluate Western systems. The factors behind this trend are diverse, yet many originate within Western societies themselves. Research by organizations such as the Pew Research Center, the United Nations, the European Council on Foreign Relations, and the OECD points to a consistent pattern. A rise in internal fragmentation. Political polarization has increased, public debates have become more confrontational, and discussions increasingly center on identity-related and cultural issues. Confidence in key institutions, including governments, parliaments, media, and administrative systems has eroded. While the Western governance model was once widely regarded as the most stable and resilient, domestic developments across several countries have created the impression of growing internal strain.
This shift has clear geopolitical implications. Soft power relies on the perception that a political and social system is stable, functional, and worthy of emulation. When images from Western countries increasingly highlight protests, political gridlock, unusual public controversies, or pronounced polarization, they influence how external observers assess the reliability and coherence of Western models. As a result, principles such as democratic governance, the rule of law, and freedom of expression are no longer assumed to be superior by default in the way they were in previous decades. Competitor states have taken note of these developments and have begun to amplify alternative narratives. Authoritarian governments frequently portray contemporary Western societies as divided or politically ineffective, contrasting this depiction with claims of stability within their own systems. Whether these portrayals are accurate is less relevant than the fact that they resonate in parts of the Global South. Across Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, surveys and diplomatic behavior suggest a more critical view of Western political performance. At the same time, many governments in these regions have shown greater willingness to pursue deeper economic or political cooperation with China or other non-Western actors. This evolution does not imply that authoritarian models have become inherently more attractive. Rather, it reflects a relative decrease in the West’s integrative power, driven largely by internal challenges. Historically, Western soft power was at its strongest when democratic states projected unity and clear purpose, as during the Cold War. Today, internal political pressures, domestic polarization, and competing societal priorities often limit the West’s ability to present a cohesive external narrative. Developments in political communication provide a clear example. In many Western countries, public discourse has grown sharper and more adversarial. Social media platforms contribute to this dynamic by amplifying polarizing content, a trend well-documented in academic research. This environment can distort the perceived center of societal opinion and elevate fringe positions. From an external perspective, this creates the impression of a political landscape marked by instability or constant confrontation.
The erosion of soft power also affects the West’s ability to project influence through institutions and alliances. International cooperation relies not only on economic or military strength but also on the perceived legitimacy and reliability of the partner. Several states that traditionally aligned themselves with Western positions now pursue more diversified strategies. This shift can be observed in global energy politics, reactions to sanctions regimes, and voting patterns in multilateral organizations. Countries such as India, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Brazil, and Indonesia increasingly balance their engagement between Western states, China, and other actors, not because of ideological realignment but due to a pragmatic assessment of their strategic options. Another outcome of declining soft power is the growing use of Western domestic challenges as counterarguments in international debates. When Western states advocate for human rights or institutional reforms abroad, they are more frequently confronted with references to their own internal divisions or political dysfunction. These rebuttals are not always accurate reflections of Western realities, but they are rhetorically effective and contribute to a weakening of Western normative influence.
Despite these challenges, it would be misleading to conclude that the West has lost its global relevance. It continues to host many of the world’s leading universities, technological innovators, and high-performing economies. Countries such as the United States, Canada, Germany, and Australia consistently rank among those with the highest standards of living. The question is not whether the West retains significant structural advantages, but whether it can restore the level of internal coherence and public confidence that underpins soft power. Rebuilding this foundation requires two central efforts. First, Western societies must strengthen social cohesion, institutional trust, and constructive political engagement. Many of today’s strategic challenges, whether in the United States, France, or elsewhere, are shaped more by internal uncertainty than by external pressure. Second, the transatlantic community must more clearly articulate the long-term strengths of its political model. Democratic governance, the rule of law, and individual liberties do not sustain themselves automatically; they require active explanation, defense, and practical demonstration. When Western societies become preoccupied with internal disputes or adopt a consistently self-critical posture without balancing it with confidence in their own institutions, geopolitical competitors are quick to occupy the resulting narrative space.
Ultimately, the geopolitical weight of the West will depend on the robustness of its political culture. If it can project confidence, demonstrate institutional resilience, and credibly uphold its core values, its soft power will remain a central feature of the international system. If not, it risks losing precisely the form of influence that distinguished it for much of the modern era.