There is little doubt that transatlantic relations are undergoing a period of profound change. For years, the United States has called on Europe—and particularly the member states of the European Union—to assume greater responsibility for their own security. At the same time, parts of Europe have increasingly advocated greater strategic autonomy from Washington. Trade disputes, diverging foreign policy priorities, and the United States’ growing focus on the Indo-Pacific have reinforced the perception that the two sides of the Atlantic may gradually drift apart. Greater European self-reliance, however, is not inherently problematic. Quite the opposite. A European Union that spends more on defense, develops a more capable defense industrial base, and becomes better able to act independently in foreign and security policy would ultimately strengthen the transatlantic alliance. The real danger would arise if a necessary rebalancing of responsibilities were to evolve into political and strategic estrangement. From a geopolitical perspective, such a development could prove to be one of the West’s most consequential mistakes since the end of the Cold War.
A Partnership of Extraordinary Scale
The European Union and the United States are connected by far more than NATO. Together, they constitute an economic, technological, financial, and security space of exceptional global importance. Combined, they account for more than 40 percent of global GDP and nearly 30 percent of global trade in goods and services. These figures matter geopolitically. Strategic estrangement would divide—and consequently diminish—that power. Such a development would be particularly problematic at a time when the global balance of power is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Russia’s war against Ukraine has profoundly altered the European security order. At the same time, China has developed within just a few decades into a major economic, technological, and military power. This transformation is accompanied by the growing assertiveness of regional powers pursuing increasingly independent interests, continuing instability in the Middle East, intensifying competition for critical resources, and the rising geopolitical importance of the Global South.
Against this backdrop, it would be strategically irrational for Europe and the United States to weaken structures that have developed over decades. Even the perception that Washington and Brussels are increasingly pursuing their interests separately expands Beijing’s room for maneuver. The same principle applies, albeit differently, to Russia. Moscow’s economic weight is considerably smaller than that of either the European Union or the United States. Yet Russia’s geopolitical leverage increases whenever competing interests within the Western alliance can be exploited. This reflects a fundamental principle of international politics: influence is determined not only by one’s own strength, but also by the degree of fragmentation among potential rivals.
It would be equally mistaken, however, to conclude that Europe should remain permanently dependent on the United States for its security. The opposite is true. European countries that assume greater responsibility, modernize their armed forces, and develop more substantial military capabilities would be more valuable partners for the United States than a Europe whose security continues to depend disproportionately on American resources. Strategic autonomy should therefore mean that Europe is capable of acting independently when necessary—not that it should seek, as a matter of principle, to act without the United States.
The United States Needs Europe, Too
It would likewise be a mistake to view the transatlantic partnership merely as an American security guarantee for Europe. The United States has global interests, and a politically stable, economically strong, and militarily capable Europe remains an important asset in advancing them. Europe provides the United States with extensive military infrastructure, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic support, economic strength, and access to one of the world’s most important markets. European allies also enhance both the political legitimacy and the practical reach of American foreign policy. If strategic competition between Washington and Beijing continues to intensify, Europe’s position will carry considerable weight. A Europe that remains politically and economically aligned with the United States can significantly influence the global balance of power. A Europe that instead attempts to maintain permanent equidistance between Washington and Beijing would substantially expand China’s strategic room for maneuver.
Washington therefore has no more interest in a strategic divorce across the Atlantic than Brussels does. There is another development that remains underappreciated in much of the public debate: the distinction between economic policy and national security is rapidly disappearing. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, energy, rare earths, telecommunications networks, ports, and transportation corridors are no longer merely economic issues. They have become central elements of national and geopolitical security.
Diverging Interests Will Remain
None of this means that transatlantic relations should be romanticized. Europe and the United States have never had completely identical interests. From the Suez Crisis to the Iraq War and repeated trade disputes, serious disagreements have always existed. They will continue to exist. Washington will increasingly focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, while Russia, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Western Balkans will retain more immediate security significance for Europe. These differences are neither surprising nor inherently problematic. They are the rational consequence of geography, history, and differing strategic priorities. Alliances, however, are not built on the assumption that their members will agree on every issue. They endure because their fundamental interests make cooperation more advantageous than the alternatives.The transatlantic partnership was created under the geopolitical conditions of the twentieth century. Expecting it to remain unchanged in the twenty-first would be unrealistic. But that does not mean it has become obsolete. Quite the contrary. In an increasingly multipolar world—defined by China’s rise, Russia’s challenge to the European security order, intensifying technological competition, and the growing importance of economic security—the transatlantic partnership may become even more geopolitically important than it was in the past. The objective should therefore not be less transatlantic cooperation, but a partnership between stronger and more autonomous partners. Europe should become more capable of defending itself and pursuing its own interests. The United States should welcome rather than fear that development. But greater European capacity should reinforce the transatlantic relationship, not replace it. A voluntary fragmentation of the transatlantic space would ultimately amount to a geopolitical gift to precisely those powers that stand to benefit most from its decline.