Perhaps historians will look back on the 2020s not only as a period of wars, crises, and geopolitical realignment. Perhaps they will also recognize them as the beginning of a fundamental political shift within the transatlantic world. On both sides of the Atlantic, parties and movements that describe themselves as conservative, national-conservative, or patriotic – or that observers classify as right-wing populist or part of the radical right – have gained political weight.
In the United States, Donald Trump has fundamentally reshaped the Republican Party. In Europe, the spectrum ranges from Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and France’s Rassemblement National to Austria’s FPÖ, Germany’s AfD, the Sweden Democrats, and the Finns Party. Yet these parties are by no means identical. Their positions on Russia and China sometimes differ fundamentally. The same applies to NATO, Ukraine, the European Union, the welfare state, and economic policy. Anyone who treats them as a single political movement is oversimplifying the picture. And yet they share something crucial: They are no longer political fringe phenomena. In various countries, they govern, participate in governments, support governments, or have reached levels of electoral support that compel other parties to adjust their own policies to a changing political landscape. This could prove to be one of the most consequential political developments of the coming years. Because if the domestic political coordinates of Europe and North America change, this will ultimately have consequences for their foreign policies as well.
“America First,” therefore, should not be viewed merely as a campaign slogan. It exemplifies a foreign policy that evaluates alliances more strongly in terms of their concrete benefits and places greater emphasis on national interests in relation to the demands of the international order. Similar tendencies can be found – in very different forms – in Europe as well. If this development continues, an old category of international politics will once again move closer to the center: the soberly defined national interest. What does an alliance cost? What does it deliver? Who pays for it? What economic benefits does it generate? And why should a state assume international obligations if their benefits to its own population are not sufficiently apparent? These questions are by no means new. What would be new, however, is if they once again became a more central point of departure for Western foreign policy. This shift could become particularly visible in security policy. For decades, Europe has grown accustomed to the United States ultimately providing the military backbone of the continent. That assumption is increasingly under pressure. The consequences are already visible. European NATO members are significantly increasing their defense spending.
This raises a second interesting question: What happens if the rise of national-conservative and sovereigntist parties simultaneously changes today’s understanding of European integration? More European defense does not necessarily mean more supranational defense. If future governments seek to return more authority to the nation-state, security cooperation will change as well. Instead of ever-deeper integration, the emphasis could shift toward stronger national armed forces, bilateral defense agreements, or smaller regional alliances. States with similar security interests could establish new formats for cooperation and enter into mutual defense commitments. The bottom line could be less political integration combined with higher defense spending.
A second change concerns migration. On both sides of the Atlantic – but particularly in Europe – migration was long treated primarily as a humanitarian issue. Increasingly, however, it is also being understood as a matter of foreign and security policy. As a result, border security, return agreements, development aid, visas, trade, and diplomatic relations will become even more closely interconnected. This will further increase the geopolitical importance of countries of origin and transit, from the Balkans and North Africa to the Middle East. In this area, foreign policy would increasingly be shaped by a very concrete question: Who can limit migration, and what political or economic price will they demand in return?
The tone toward China could change as well. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that right-wing parties are automatically hostile toward China. There are considerable differences here. Nevertheless, major economic dependencies on the People’s Republic are in tension with a political approach that places greater emphasis on national sovereignty, domestic industry, and strategic autonomy. Industrial policy, tariffs, investment controls, raw materials, and the security of critical supply chains will therefore continue to gain importance. Globalization would not disappear as a result, but it would increasingly be viewed through the lens of national security.
And Russia? This is where the supposed unity of the European right becomes particularly tenuous. While parts of the political right take a distinctly critical view of Russia and support a strong NATO, other forces advocate considerably more conciliatory positions toward Moscow.
For precisely this reason, it would be wrong to speak of a common “right-wing foreign policy.” Perhaps the real common denominator lies less in what kind of foreign policy these parties want to pursue than in how they justify foreign policy. That can lead to entirely different outcomes. Perhaps this is also why the term “shift to the right” is too simplistic. What we are witnessing is, rather, a shift in what is politically capable of commanding majority support – and therefore in what can also become feasible in foreign policy. Priorities are being reordered. Migration, national sovereignty, border security, defense, energy security, industrial competitiveness, and strategic dependencies are increasingly taking on a different significance. At the same time, skepticism toward institutions and international obligations is growing among parts of the population.
This does not necessarily mean that right-wing governments will dominate everywhere over the next ten years. Democracies do not develop in a linear fashion. They are dynamic. Perhaps, then, we are not entering a decade in which the right governs everywhere. But we may be entering a decade in which politics on both sides of the Atlantic is increasingly shaped by issues that were long associated primarily with the political right.
That would be a significant distinction. Because when political priorities change, foreign-policy interests eventually change as well. And when those interests shift simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic, the effects will not remain confined to national parliaments and election campaigns. They will also reach alliances and trade relations. And ultimately, the international order itself.
Because democracies are not the only things that are dynamic. The world order is, too.