The geopolitical debate about the transatlantic relationship is increasingly shaped by narratives of decline. Shifting priorities in Washington, demographic aging in Europe, and a growing regional focus on both sides of the Atlantic fuel the assumption of a gradual decoupling. Yet this perspective falls short. It overlooks a region that could, in the medium term, help bring Brussels and Washington closer together again: Latin America. Historically, this Region has never been a geopolitical vacuum. Nevertheless, within transatlantic thinking it long occupied a secondary position. For Europe due to geographic distance, for the United States due to political self-evidence. This constellation is now changing. Migration, economic interdependence, and strategic competition from external actors are giving the region renewed significance. Regardless of changing administrations, it has always been clear that external power projection in this region does not occur without response.
Ongoing migration from Central America, South America, and the Caribbean affects not only U.S. labor markets and social structures, but increasingly political priorities as well. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau have for years shown above-average growth in the Hispanic share of the U.S. population. This development is reshaping domestic political sensitivity to issues of regional stability, economic development, and security cooperation. These shifts are not driven by ideology, but by pragmatic considerations. Greater foreign-policy attention to Latin America is therefore less an expression of a strategic turn away from Europe than a consequence of societal realities.
At the same time, Latin America is also moving more clearly into Europe’s field of vision. Not because of demographic proximity, but due to economic and strategic logic. The planned free trade agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR could be a central pillar of such an approach. Its stalled progress reflects less a lack of interest than Europe’s fragmented interests. Agricultural protection concerns, environmental considerations, and domestic political risks overlap and obscure a comprehensive strategic assessment. From a strategic perspective, MERCOSUR would be far more than a trade agreement. It would anchor Europe over the long term in a region that is demographically growing, rich in resources, and increasingly contested geopolitically. While the People’s Republic of China systematically expands its economic presence in Latin America and the United States intensifies its regional focus, Europe risks losing influence there as well without institutional anchoring.
Beyond this, the South American continent possesses considerable potential as a connecting space. In the medium term, the region could become an area in which European and American interests do not conflict but complement one another. For Washington, stability in its immediate “backyard” is paramount. For Europe, the focus lies on market access, supply chains, raw materials, and economic diversification. These perspectives are fundamentally compatible. This convergence, however, remains fragile if it is understood solely as a strategic arrangement among external actors. Sustainable anchoring requires that the societies of the MERCOSUR states themselves benefit from economic integration, investment, and political cooperation. Without tangible development effects, employment prospects, and institutional strengthening, any external rapprochement risks being perceived as a continuation of asymmetric dependencies. Particularly in a region where trust in Western actors has been shaped by historical experience, disappointed expectations, and unequal power relations.
Genuine participation determines legitimacy. Influence cannot be secured through presence alone, but only through partnerships perceived as mutually beneficial. A stronger European presence in Latin America could even relieve Washington without diminishing U.S. influence. Conversely, European actors benefit from the security stabilization enabled by American presence. A prerequisite for this, however, is political coherence on the part of Brussels. In this scenario, the transatlantic relationship would not weaken, but evolve functionally: less exclusive, less Eurocentric, yet more broadly based. Latin America would be neither a substitute for Europe in U.S. foreign policy nor a substitute for the United States in Europe’s security architecture. Rather, it would constitute a shared reference space.
In a world of growing bloc formation, this perspective is far from trivial. Cooperation becomes durable where interests overlap without being identical. Latin America offers precisely this intersection: economically relevant, demographically dynamic, and geopolitically open. The decisive question, therefore, is not whether the transatlantic bond is weakening. What matters is whether Europe and the United States are prepared to rethink it spatially and strategically. Latin America may prove less a test case than a catalyst. As so often in international politics, alliances do not lose relevance when they change. They lose relevance when they fail to adapt to change.