Anti-Americanism, Security Reality, and the Strategic Void in European Defense Policy
For some time now, the European Union’s reactions toward the United States have appeared contradictory – at times even paradoxical. On the one hand, there is a growing political and rhetorical desire to distance Europe from Washington. On the other hand, even the announcement of possible troop reductions or structural reforms to the American military presence in Europe triggers visible unease. These two impulses sit uneasily together and point to a deeper underlying problem. For more than two decades, a subtle, often carefully articulated, form of anti-Americanism has run through parts of the European public sphere. It expresses itself less in open rejection than in a persistent questioning of American motives, moral distancing, and a reflexive emphasis on presumed European superiority, civilizational, normative, and multilateral. Since the Iraq War of 2003 at the latest, this attitude has become socially acceptable. It outlasted changing U.S. administrations and established itself as a stable feature of political debate, media narratives, and academic discourse. At the same time, however, the security reality remained largely unchanged. Europe’s defense has continued to rely on American capabilities in key areas: strategic airlift, intelligence and reconnaissance, satellite communications, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and command-and-control structures. This dependence was not understood as a strategic deficit but was long accepted as a given. The political convenience lay in enjoying security guarantees without bearing the associated costs, risks, and often uncomfortable domestic debates.
Against this backdrop, the current nervousness is understandable. When Washington considers adjusting troop levels, reforming command structures, or rebalancing Europe’s weight within the global security architecture in favor of Asia, it confronts a continent that is scarcely prepared to respond independently. Expressions of outrage over alleged American “unreliability” stand in stark contrast to Europe’s own decades-long reluctance to treat defense as a serious core responsibility of the state. In this context, the frequently invoked call for European “strategic autonomy” remains strikingly inconsequential, particularly as long as bureaucratic structures are not meaningfully streamlined. Defense budgets from Paris to Berlin were neglected for years, military capabilities fragmented, and national interests insufficiently integrated. European initiatives remained piecemeal, politically cautious, and operationally limited. Autonomy was proclaimed; dependence was managed. This is where the central contradiction lies. A political discourse that seeks to distance itself from American power meets a security reality that is scarcely sustainable without an American presence. Fear of a U.S. withdrawal therefore reflects less a sudden change in American policy than a mirror of European powerlessness. It reveals how little strategic room for maneuver Europe has created for itself.
Historically, this is no accident. Europe’s postwar order was deliberately designed around American security guarantees. Yet while other forms of dependence were gradually and proactively reduced over time, security dependence remained largely untouched. That strategic comfort, however, has now been exhausted definitively so with the second Trump administration. This development is less about individual political actors or their personal style than about a fundamental paradigm shift, one that is to a significant extent self-inflicted. The international order has become more multipolar and more conflict-prone, and former partners are increasingly unwilling to sustain or compensate for European preferences indefinitely. The current tension in transatlantic relations is therefore not an anomaly but a symptom. It exposes what has long been obscured: European defense policy is less the result of deliberate strategic choice than the product of political avoidance. As long as this does not change, appeals to Washington, moral distancing, and continued dependence will coexist side by side. A condition that is neither credible nor sustainable. The real question, therefore, is not whether the United States will adjust its presence in Europe. The question is why, after decades of declarations, Europe still lacks the confidence and capacity to absorb such adjustments with strategic self-assurance.